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Booker Reconsidered
JonathanS. Masurt
INTRODUCTION
By some measures, United States v Booker' is the most important

case the Seventh Circuit has decided in decades. On the heels of the
Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v Washington2 to invalidate Washington State's mandatory sentencing guidelines,' the Seventh Circuit
held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were constitutionally infirm as well.4 Prompted by the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and struck down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
six months later in United States v Booker,' uprooting the decades-old
system of determinate federal sentencing. Booker's reverberations continue to be felt, as federal courts struggle with the newly permissive sentencing regime and the Supreme Court decides case after subsequent
case in an effort to iron out the wrinkles caused by its decision.
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
I thank Frank Easterbrook, Tom Gorman, Bernard Harcourt, Carissa Hessick, Richard
McAdams, and David Sklansky for helpful comments.
1 375 F3d 508 (7th Cir 2004).
2
542 US 296 (2004).
3
Id at 302-05.
4
Booker, 375 F3d at 510-13 ("[I]f a legislature cannot evade what the Supreme Court
deems the commands of the Constitution by a multistage sentencing scheme neither, it seems
plain, can a regulatory agency.").
5 543 US 220, 243-44 (2005) (concluding that the Sentencing Guidelines ran afoul of the

t

Sixth Amendment's requirement that "[alny fact ... necessary to support a sentence ... must be

admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt").
6
See, for example, Nelson v United States, 129 S Ct 890,892 (2009) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines should not be presumed reasonable by sentencing courts); Spears v United
States, 129 S Ct 840, 843-44 (2009) (holding that the district court was entitled to reject the 100to-1 ratio in the crack-cocaine sentencing guidelines); Oregon v Ice, 129 S Ct 711, 716-20 (2009)
(holding that the decision to impose sentences consecutively, rather than concurrently, was not
traditionally considered to fall within the "domain of the jury," and allowing judges to do so);
Greenlaw v United States, 128 S Ct 2559,2562 (2008) (holding that the court of appeals could not,
on its own initiative, increase a defendant's sentence when the original sentence was fifteen years
less than the applicable law required); Irizarry v United States, 128 S Ct 2198, 2202-04 (2008)
(holding that FRCrP 32(h) does not apply to variances from the recommended Sentencing
Guidelines range); Kimbrough v United States, 552 US 85, 91 (2007) (holding that district court
judges can sentence below the Sentencing Guidelines for drug trafficking purely based on a
policy disagreement with the Guidelines' disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine of-
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The judges who formed the Booker majority on the Seventh Circuit have undoubtedly had a profound impact upon the law. Indeed,
for most judges, influence is defined by victory. An opinion the judge
has written might carry the day in the judge's own court and then be
adopted across the country. Or the judge may find herself in the minority at home but be vindicated by a higher court, her reasoning validated. This is the conventional account, and one that has been repeated throughout Judge Frank Easterbrook's career.
Yet Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Booker may turn out to be
one of the most significant he has written, despite the fact that his
views in that case were rejected-twice. Judge Easterbrook, unable to
command a majority in the Seventh Circuit, instead penned a pointed
dissent that urged the Supreme Court to take the case. The Court did
just that, but then affirmed the majority and rejected Judge Easterbrook's arguments to the contrary. For most judges, the narrative
would end there.
But Easterbrook's dissent will likely exert a far greater influence
in the years to come. In the course of a few short pages, Easterbrook
exposes the majority position as excessively formalist in crucial respects and prefigures a series of problems that have since developed
with the Supreme Court's new sentencing framework. And as a mere
prologue, Easterbrook offers a compelling meta-analysis of the appellate courts' appropriate institutional role in cases where Supreme
Court precedent has been thrown into doubt.
This Essay begins with a discussion of Easterbrook's metaanalysis of the role of appellate courts within the federal system. It
then scrutinizes Easterbrook's substantive arguments regarding
Booker, Blakely, and the institutional structures surrounding federal
sentencing. On both issues, Easterbrook's position of disagreement
fenses); Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 51-53 (2007) (holding that, under Booker, a sentence

must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, regardless of whether it falls within the
Sentencing Guidelines range); Rita v United States, 551 US 338, 347-51 (2007) (holding that an
appellate court can presume that a sentence is reasonable when it falls within the Sentencing
Guidelines range).
7 See, for example, Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 904 F2d 1081,1120-35 (7th Cir 1990)
(Easterbrook dissenting) (arguing that Indiana was free to regulate public nudity even though
the regulation had the inadvertent effect of also regulating expressive dancing), revd, Barnes v
Glen Theatre, Inc, 501 US 560 (1991) (holding that a valid governmental interest allowed restrictions on nude dancing without violating the First Amendment); International Union, UAW v
Johnson Controls, Inc, 886 F2d 871, 908-15 (7th Cir 1989) (Easterbrook dissenting) (noting that
courts regularly see sex, race, and age discrimination for the purpose of protecting members of
the public as disparate treatment requiring a "bona fide occupational qualification" and asserting
that there is no reason why this requirement should be any different for fetuses), revd, 499 US
187, 206-07 (1991) (holding that Johnson Controls could not establish a bona fide occupational
qualification and that Judge Easterbrook correctly observed that the welfare of the next generation cannot be considered a part of the essence of Johnson's business).

Booker Reconsidered

2010]1

1093

with the Seventh Circuit majority, and with the Supreme Court, has
been substantially vindicated.
I. THE APPELLATE COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

Booker's history begins with the Supreme Court's decision in
Blakely v Washington striking down the state of Washington's determinate sentencing regime as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's
right to trial by jury.! To review: the Washington legislature had
enacted guidelines directing judges to sentence convicted criminals to
fixed terms of imprisonment that depended partially on the elements
of the crime, either found by the jury or admitted by the defendant,
and partially on other facts found only by the judge at sentencing.o
Ralph Blakely, Jr had been convicted of second-degree kidnapping,
which carried a presumptive guideline sentence of forty-nine to fiftythree months in prison." However, Washington's guidelines permitted
the judge to impose an "exceptional sentence" of up to 120 months if
she found a "substantial and compelling reason[]" for doing so." In
Blakely's case, the judge found that the kidnapper acted with "deliberate cruelty." The judge made this finding (without a jury) and sentenced Blakely to a ninety-month term. 4 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court invalidated Washington's sentencing guidelines, holding
that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""
And the Court held that the "prescribed statutory maximum" under
Washington's system was the presumptive forty-nine to fifty-three
month sentence dictated by the defendant's guilty plea.
The decision in Blakely immediately cast doubt upon the continued viability of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, despite the fact
that the Supreme Court had upheld them against a similar challenge

8 Blakely, 542 US at 302-05 ("When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict
alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to the
punishment,' and the judge exceeds his proper authority.").
9 Id at 298-99 (clarifying that Blakely pleaded guilty only to second-degree kidnapping,
domestic violence, and use of a firearm, resulting in a sentence within the forty-nine to fifty-three
month Guidelines range, which included a thirty-six month enhancement for use of a firearm).
10

Id at 299.

11

Id.

12
13

Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.120(2) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.505(2) (West).
Blakely, 542 US at 300.

14

Id.

Is Id at 301, quoting Apprendi v New Jersey,530 US 466,490 (2000) (quotation marks omitted).
16 Blakely, 542 US at 303-05.
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just seven years prior." The Sentencing Guidelines differed from
Washington's only in that they had been written by an administrative
body-the United States Sentencing Commission-rather than the
legislature. Accordingly, in response to an "avalanche of motions for
resentencing in the light of Blakely,"" the Seventh Circuit immediately
expedited review of a case that raised the same issues regarding the
federal Guidelines." The appellate court perceived no meaningful distinction between Washington's legislative rules and the federal administrative rules and struck down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines."
Easterbrook dissented from the panel's opinion. Before he
turned to the merits of the case, however, he paused to offer a pointed
exegesis on the propriety of the Seventh Circuit effectively overturning standing Supreme Court precedent, even precedent that appeared
to have been undone by more recent developments.2 ' "Just as opera
stars often go on singing after being shot, stabbed, or poisoned," he
noted colorfully, "so judicial opinions often survive what could be fatal
blows."22 Easterbrook catalogued a series of Supreme Court precedents that retained their vitality despite being seemingly contradicted
by more recent holdings.23 He concluded that the appellate court
should stay its hand pending further instruction from the Supreme
Court: "The alternative is bedlam -which is the likely consequence of
today's decision."24
17 See Edwards v United States, 523 US 511, 513-14 (1998). To be clear, the Seventh Circuit
Booker majority may have been within its rights to overturn the Sentencing Guidelines even taking
Edwards into account. As a rule, an appellate court may not overturn an existing Supreme Court
decision in light of a newer one unless the latter explicitly overruled the former. State Oil Co v
Khan, 522 US 3, 20 (1997) ("[I]t is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents."). However, it is at least arguable that the Booker decision did not require overruling Edwards because the Court in Edwards never addressed the Sixth Amendment argument raised in
Booker. Compare Booker, 375 F3d at 513-14 (noting that the Edwards opinion did not address the
constitutional right to a jury trial, and the Edwards petitioners never even mentioned the Sixth
Amendment) with id at 516-17 (Easterbrook dissenting) (arguing that constitutional issues were
raised in Edwards, and the Edwards Court still upheld the Sentencing Guidelines). The point that
follows here is not that the majority violated the Supreme Court's rules in striking down the Sentencing Guidelines, but that it would have been well advised to have stayed its hand.

18 Booker, 375 F3d at 510.

19 Blakely was decided June 24, 2004; Booker was argued before a panel of the Seventh
Circuit on July 6,2004, and decided on July 9,2004.
20
Booker, 375 F3d at 510-13.
21 Id at 516 (Easterbrook dissenting) (arguing that, for the majority to reach its result, it
"must conclude that Edwards v United States was wrongly decided," a decision that is inappropriate for "intermediate judges in a hierarchical system").
22 Id (noting that while Blakely may suggest that Edwards is "on its last legs[,] ... [ilt does
not imply that we are entitled to put it in a coffin while it is still breathing").
2
Id, citing Lemon v Kurtzman, 411 US 192 (1973); Alrmendarez-Torres v United States, 523
US 224 (1998).
24 Booker, 375 F3d at 516 (Easterbrook dissenting).
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Easterbrook's complaint had merit. The Supreme Court was almost certain to review Booker-the Court granted certiorari on August 2, 2004, less than a month after the Seventh Circuit decision" -and
so the appellate ruling was unlikely to stand long in any event. But what
if the Supreme Court's interest had been less evident? An appellate
decision that contravenes existing Supreme Court precedent, and especially one that overturns a national legislative or regulatory apparatus,
effectively forces Supreme Court action. Once the Seventh Circuit has
struck down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court is forced to
take the case, irrespective of whether it has any intention of acting or
feels the time for intervention is right. The costs of remaining uninvolved -uncertainty and chaos in the federal criminal justice system,
and inequities and disparities in sentencing rules across circuits-are
simply too great. This is the "bedlam" Judge Easterbrook warned of,
and while it was unlikely to occur in Booker, it might easily erupt in a
subsequent case.6 Decisions such as the Seventh Circuit's compel the
Supreme Court to consume judicial resources whether or not those resources could be better deployed elsewhere.
What, then, was to be gained from striking down the Sentencing
Guidelines? The majority's decision undoubtedly sent a strong signal
to the Court that the issue was ripe for adjudication and helpfully described the logic by which Blakely undermined the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. But these are objectives that could have been accomplished equally well under the opposite holding. The circuit court
simply could have made the identical arguments regarding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, highlighted the question for
the Supreme Court, and then left the Guidelines in place. In fact,
Judge Richard Posner, the author of the Booker majority opinion, did
precisely this eight years earlier in Khan v State Oil Co.n The availabilUnited States v Booker, 542 US 956 (2004) (granting certiorari).
The federal courts stayed nearly every sentencing proceeding in the wake of Blakely and
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Booker pending the Supreme Court's decision in that case. See,
for example, United States v Love, 2004 WL 2011445, *2 (WD Wis) (staying the defendant's
motion for reduction of his sentence).
27
93 F3d 1358, 1363-64 (7th Cir 1996) (noting the "increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations" of the Court's precedent, arguing that the precedent should be overruled, but concluding that it was not within the authority of the court of appeals to do so), vacd and remd, State Oil
Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 20 (1997) (expressing approval of the court of appeals' decision to follow
precedent, despite its disagreement with the result). It is notable that both the majority and
dissent in Booker cited to the Supreme Court's decision in Khan, but neither explicitly mentioned the alternative course of action it suggested. Compare Booker, 375 F3d at 513 (discussing
that although Khan does not allow the court to overrule Supreme Court precedent, Edwards
does not discuss the constitutional questions and therefore no overruling would be necessary)
with id at 516 (Easterbrook dissenting) (explaining that the majority decision would essentially
overrule the Sentencing Guidelines, replacing them with the court's interpretation). Another
possibility for this court would have been to invoke the rarely used Supreme Court Rule 19, also
25
26
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ity of this option casts doubt upon the manner in which the appellate
courts fulfill their mission of "developing the law," particularly when
they are called upon to review federal statutory schemes that have
already been approved-in one form or another-by the Supreme
Court." That problem was potentially even more acute in the context
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Had the Supreme Court not
acted expeditiously, the Seventh Circuit's actions would have undermined the Guidelines' very reason for existence: uniformity in federal
criminal sentencing.
Judge Easterbrook's protest raises a more general point about
the interaction between principals and agents within a hierarchical
administrative system. In choosing a course of action, the agent must
always take into account the costs to the principal of monitoring the
agent and reversing the decision. If the transition costs of reversing
one potential course of action are low and the costs of reversing an
alternative course of action are higher, it may be preferable for the
agent to adopt the former course even if it believes, with some probability, that the latter course is superior. The systemic costs of choosing
the right path-including the principal's monitoring and reversal
costs-may be lower if the agent initially adopts the program that is
cheaper to undo.0 And where the inferior actor's correct course of
action is highly unclear, as it may be in a contested Supreme Court
case, discrepancies in reversal costs could be decisive.
Consider the following stylized example." An agent has a choice
between enacting Policy A or Policy B. Policy A yields a benefit of 10
allowed under 28 USC § 1254, and certify the question to the Supreme Court for resolution. The
Fifth Circuit recently used this procedure. See United States v Seale, 577 F3d 566, 567 (5th Cir
2009) (certifying the question of a statute of limitations for a kidnapping that occurred in 1964,
but was indicted in 2007). However, the Supreme Court dismissed the certified question. United
States v Seale, 130 S Ct 12, 12 (2009). In fact, the Supreme Court has said that in most cases the
courts of appeals should decide the issues in front of them, except for "in the rare instances, as
for example the pendency of another case before this Court raising the same issue, when certification may be advisable in the proper administration and expedition of judicial business." Wisniewski v United States, 353 US 901,902 (1957).
28 See Richard A. Posner, Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 230 (Harvard 1985) (noting

the existence of a large audience for judicial opinions beyond the immediate litigants to the
case). See also id at 251-52.
29
See Yair Listokin, Learningthrough Policy Variation, 118 Yale L J 480,524-29 (2008).
30
Of course, there are systemic advantages to "guessing" what the Supreme Court will
decide. If an appellate court stubbornly adheres to old Supreme Court precedent that may be
outdated, and the Court eventually overturns that precedent, the appellate court may be forced
to revisit the decisions it made in the interim. This can be costly. However, the lower court can
avoid these costs by simply staying all related cases while the case is pending before the Supreme
Court. Indeed, this is precisely what occurred after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Booker. See,
for example, United States v McKee, 389 F3d 697,701 (7th Cir 2004).
31 For the purposes of this model, I assume that the interests of the principal and agent are
aligned.
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with 60 percent probability and a benefit of 0 with 40 percent probability. Policy B yields a benefit of 10 with 50 percent probability and a
benefit of 0 with 50 percent probability. After the agent selects a policy, the principal can observe the effect of the policy and, if necessary,
switch to the alternative policy. Imagine that these switching costs are
asymmetric: the principal can switch from Policy B to Policy A at a
cost of 3, but incurs a cost of 4 to switch from Policy A to Policy B.
Based on the agent's actions alone, the expected value of choosing
Policy A is greater than the expected value of Policy B (6 to 5). But
once the principal's role in monitoring is introduced, this inequality is
reversed: the expected value of Policy A is 8.4, and the expected value
of Policy B is 8.5.32 If the agent can observe the principal's transition
costs, she should select Policy B, despite the fact that by itself it yields
a lower expected outcome.
In this sense, the rule prohibiting an appellate court from overturning Supreme Court precedent can be understood as a proxy for an
inquiry into the monitoring and reversal costs faced by the Supreme
Court. If the Supreme Court has not expressly overturned its own
precedent, it is possible that it may elect not to do so, even if subsequent cases have undercut the foundations of that precedent.33 This
suggests that the lower court should pay particular attention to the
costs of a potential reversal. But it is only a proxy; there may be conditions under which similar caution by the lower court is warranted,
even if one course of appellate action does not require specifically
overruling existing Supreme Court precedent. A case challenging the
constitutionality of a national administrative system, and one that will
turn on a 5-4 vote, presents such an example. Thus, from an institutional standpoint Judge Easterbrook may well have been correct that
the Seventh Circuit should have stayed its hand.

32 Policy A is 60 percent likely to yield a benefit of 10 and 40 percent likely to yield a benefit of 6 (10 after the principal switches to Policy B minus 4 in switching costs), for an expected
benefit of 8.4. Policy B is 50 percent likely to yield a benefit of 10 and 50 percent likely to yield a
benefit of 7 (10 after the principal switches to Policy A minus 3 in switching costs), for an expected benefit of 8.5.
33 As an example, Judge Easterbrook cites Lemon. See Booker, 375 F3d at 516 (Easterbrook dissenting) (remarking that Lemon, though inconsistent with later decisions and criticized
by several justices, has not been overruled).
34 Both Blakely and Booker were decided by 5-4 votes, and the Booker Court was so divided over the result that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg switched sides and formed a different
majority when deciding the remedy.
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II. PRAGMATISM AND FORMALISM IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

A. Institutional Incongruities
Judge Frank Easterbrook has frequently described himself (and
been described) as a legal formalist," particularly when it comes to
statutory interpretation.6 These labels of course represent an oversimplification, and Judge Easterbrook has demonstrated an admirable
willingness to reason pragmatically when the situation appears to call
for it." An important opportunity of this type arose in Booker. In
Blakely, the Supreme Court had held that only a jury could find facts
that increased the possible penalty for a crime above the "statutory
maximum."" Booker turned on whether the maximum sentences set
by the Sentencing Guidelines -regulations created by an administrative body-were to be considered "statutory" limits per the terms of
Blakely. The Booker majority held that they were.39
The majority's argument rested on fundamental axioms of institutional delegation: "The Commission is exercising power delegated to it
by Congress, and if a legislature cannot evade what the Supreme Court
deems the commands of the Constitution by a multistage sentencing
scheme neither, it seems plain, can a regulatory agency."4 If the legislature could not delegate sentencing factfinding to a judge per Blakely,
neither can an agency employ delegated congressional authority to do
the same.4 This argument not only carried great intuitive force;42 it also
35 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo Wash L
Rev 1119, 1121 (1998) (arguing that contractarian models, which provide "[tihe fundamental
theory of political legitimacy in the United States," require formalism); Frank H. Easterbrook,

Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance,Judges,22 Harv J L & Pub Pol 13, 20 (1998) (arguing for
formalism in constitutional interpretation); Kham & Nate's Shoes No 2, Inc v FirstBank of Whit-

ing, 908 F2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir 1990) (Easterbrook) (calling for greater formality in contract
doctrine); Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory InterpretationMatter? A Case Study, 94 Nw

U L Rev 1409,1409 (2000) (classifying Judge Posner as a pragmatist and Judge Easterbrook as a
formalist). Compare Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 1 (Harvard 2003)
(classifying himself as a pragmatist).
36 See, for example, Easterbrook, 22 Hary J L & Pub Pol at 17-18 (cited in note 35) (remarking that "there is no good argument for judges," rather than the legislature, "to have the
final word").
37 See Farber, 94 Nw U L Rev at 1410, 1416-23 (cited in note 35) (noting that Easterbrook's dissent in Adams v Plaza Finance Co, 168 F3d 932,937-43 (7th Cir 1999), is "much more
pragmatic than one might have expected" and that his opinion "does not quite fit his own description of formalism").
38 Blakely, 542 US at 301.
39 Booker, 375 F3d at 511-12.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook rejected this argument out of hand, noting that the majority had cited nothing for this proposition. Id at 519 (Easterbook dissenting) ("Phrases such as 'it
seems plain' are poor substitutes for authority in the Constitution's text or interpretive history.").
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comported with Judge Easterbrook's own Chevron jurisprudence,
which explicitly justifies judicial deference on delegation grounds."
Yet as Judge Easterbrook pointed out, a variety of other institutional actors were in violation of these same rules, and in ways that the
majority apparently did not find troubling." The Booker majority believed that an agency could not make binding sentencing determinations based upon facts that had not been found by a jury, yet thought
it presented no constitutional problem if a federal or state parole
board were permitted to play precisely the same role.4 (Before the
advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines criminals were often sentenced to fixed terms with the possibility of parole, and the United
States Parole Commission had developed guidelines based on the
facts of the crime to determine when prisoners should be released.47 )
As Easterbrook explained, those guidelines frequently depended on
facts not proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt," and nevertheless the Blakely Court did not believe that parole boards' actions
ran afoul of the Constitution.4 9
More importantly, Easterbrook observed that the majority's reading of Blakely would appear to allow judges to accomplish through
precedent and common law adjudication what the Sentencing Commission could not achieve via rulemaking-and again without the
presence of a jury." Consider a statute setting the maximum prison
43 See, for example, Horn FarrnsInc v Johanns,397 F3d 472,476 (7th Cir 2005) (Easterbrook)
("If agencies and legislators read ambiguous language differently, the agency wins under Chevron.
When Congress delegates to the Executive Branch a power of interpretation, it surrenders any
opportunity to rule the outcome via statements in committee."); Flores v Ashcroft, 350 F3d 666,671
(7th Cir 2003) (Easterbrook) ("Yet Chevron deference depends on delegation.").
44 Booker, 375 F3d at 519 (Easterbrook dissenting).
45

Id at 511.

Consider Blakely, 542 US at 309 (implying that parole boards raise no constitutional
concerns). See also United States v Addonizio, 442 US 178,182 (1979) (explaining that the United States Parole Commission took into consideration the "gravity of the offense," among other
factors, when deciding whether to grant parole).
47 See Addonizio, 442 US at 180-82 (describing the impact of these guidelines on one
prisoner who, despite expecting to serve only one-third of his sentence, was denied parole twice
because of the Parole Commission's new policies). The Federal Parole Board and the practice of
paroling federal prisoners were abolished by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, at the time of
the Guidelines' creation. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 §§ 218(a)(5), 235, Pub L No 98-473,
98 Stat 1837,2027,2031 (repealing the federal parole laws, effective as of November 1,1987).
48 See Booker, 375 F3d at 520 (Easterbrook dissenting) (providing an example of the type
of system the Parole Commission might create in order "to ensure consistent treatment of offenders": "Hold bank robbers in prison for 10 years; hold armed bank robbers for 20; hold armed
bank robbers who discharge their weapons or take hostages for 30 .
49
See Blakely, 542 US at 309 (explaining that the facts considered by a parole board "do
not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all
the difference").
5o Booker, 375 F3d at 519 (Easterbrook dissenting) (noting that there would be no issue,
under Blakely, if a defendant was convicted of a crime with an open-ended sentence, and the
46
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term for distributing cocaine at twenty years. Booker held that a sentencing commission could not establish mandatory guidelines prescribing different terms depending on judicial findings regarding the
amount of cocaine the criminal had distributed, whether the criminal
had brandished a weapon, and so forth. Yet these same rules could
legitimately evolve through the common law: an appellate court might
rule that it was presumptively reasonable for a judge to sentence a
cocaine dealer to twenty years if he brandished a weapon and ten
years if he did not, based purely on the judge's view of the facts.' That
rule would hold precedential value in the lower courts. It would effectively function as an alternative system of determinate sentencing
based on judicial factfinding, precisely what the Booker court believed
was impermissible.
If the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional, explained
Judge Easterbrook, then so too were parole boards and precedential
judicial sentencing rules (unless they were based purely on jury findings).52 Overturning those institutions in addition to the Sentencing
Guidelines would cast the entire federal criminal justice system into
disarray, creating operational nightmares for judges, attorneys, and
defendants that might prove intolerable.53 For this eminently practical
reason, Judge Easterbrook could not believe that the Sentencing
Guidelines were truly infirm. Yet that is what the Seventh Circuit and
the Supreme Court held.
B.

The Pragmatic Problems with Booker's Logical Consequences
1. Booker's aftermath.

The perceived evil that the Supreme Court intended to address in
Booker was the practice of judges sentencing convicted offenders
based upon facts that only the judge-and not a jury-had found. The
most straightforward remedy might have been to require that all sentencing facts be found by juries." (More on this later.) But it was not
the remedy the Court selected. Rather, the Supreme Court declared
judge relied on a common law rule-"10 years unless the burglar uses a gun; if a gun, then
40 years"-to determine the length of the sentence).
51 See 18 USC § 3742 (stating that sentences must be reasonable).
52 Booker, 375 F3d at 519-20 (Easterbrook dissenting) (explaining that both Apprendi and
Blakely apply only to statutes, and posing the question: "[i]f parole regulations are valid, why not
the federal Sentencing Guidelines?").
53 Or, as Judge Easterbrook put it, "Today's decision will discombobulate the whole criminallaw docket." Id at 521 (predicting that the Supreme Court would respond quickly to the decision).
5 In fact, when the Seventh Circuit's Booker opinion was appealed to the Supreme Court,
the justices who dissented from the Court's remedial opinion argued for exactly this result. See
United States v Booker, 543 US 220,284-85 (2005) (Stevens dissenting).
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that the Guidelines were only advisory, not binding, on the federal
courts." Of course, this did not alter the absolute upper limit on sentences imposed by criminal statutes; it only eliminated the mandatory
gradations within that statutory limit. Thus, if the maximum penalty
permitted by statute for distribution of cocaine was forty years in
prison, judges could now sentence a convicted cocaine dealer to any
term in prison subject only to the forty-year ceiling. The only constraints on judicial discretion were the judge's duty to consider a particular set of (broad) factors, and the requirement that the sentence
be reasonable.'
As a formal matter, after Booker, judges are no longer required
to find relevant facts and sentence within a mandatory guidelines
range. Nonetheless, the Booker remedial opinion is clear in its expectation that judges will continue to engage in the practice of "real conduct" sentencing-that is, sentencing offenders based upon their actual offense conduct, not the offense of conviction-even under the
advisory guidelines." As a practical matter, this is precisely what continues to take place. Judges have to find some means of selecting sentences within the broad ranges permitted by statute, and they can
hardly ignore facts presented at trial, even where those facts were not
formally proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
judges continue to sentence offenders based on the facts of the case as
they believe them to exist, not merely based on what the prosecution
proves to the jury.
Yet with the Guidelines eliminated as a constraining force on real
offense sentencing, criminal sentences immediately began to diverge
from one another, and courts struggled to evaluate reasonableness
within a set of legal rules that provided very little guidance. The appellate courts moved to impose some order on this haphazard system. Not
55
Id at 244-45 (Breyer) (requiring courts to consider the Guidelines, but allowing them to
consider additional factors).
56
18 USC §3553 (listing the relevant factors, including the "nature and circumstances of
the offense," the defendant's history, the types of sentences available, the need to demonstrate
the seriousness of the crime, and the sentence's potential deterrent effects).
57 18 USC § 3742 (allowing the court of appeals to consider whether the sentence appears
to be "unreasonable" in light of the Guidelines range and the factors listed in § 3553). See also
Booker, 543 US at 261-63 (Breyer) (requiring appellate courts to consider the § 3553 factors to
determine whether a sentence is "reasonable").
58
See Booker, 543 US at 251. See also 18 USC §3661 ("No limitation shall be placed on
the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence.").
59 David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 Harv L Rev 1634, 1659 n 153 (2009)
(explaining that sentencing judges have never needed to rely solely on the "facts and arguments
put forward by the parties," and that Blakely and Booker did not lessen judges' abilities to inquire into additional facts when determining a sentence).
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surprisingly, they latched onto the Sentencing Guidelines themselves as
a means for gauging reasonableness and curbing trial court discretion.
Every institutional actor involved in the criminal justice systemprosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and perhaps even criminals-had
formed a set of expectations based on the Sentencing Guidelines and
(one hopes) structured its conduct with those Guidelines in mind. If
nothing else, the Guidelines were "reasonable" in the sense that they
were predictable (and predicted). Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines
were the product of an expert body, created by the political branches to
determine appropriate federal criminal sentences..
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized on many
accounts since their inception,6 but to the courts they appeared to serve
as a useful starting point from which to judge reasonableness -perhaps
a better one than any group of federal judges could devise if writing on
a clean slate. Thus, in a series of decisions following Booker, the appellate courts held that any sentence imposed within the (advisory) Guidelines range was presumptively reasonable,62 and that the greater the
divergence between a sentence and the Guidelines' advised range, the
greater the burden placed upon the district court to justify it.
The Supreme Court was willing to follow the lower courts only
halfway. The Court agreed that sentences within the Guidelines range
should be viewed as presumptively reasonable. But it explicitly re60
See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 363-70 (1989) (describing the history and
creation of the Guidelines, and the duties of the Sentencing Commission).
61 See, for example, Ryan Scott Reynolds, Note, Equal Justice under Law: Post-Booker,
Should Federal Judges Be Able to Depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Remedy
Disparity between Codefendants' Sentences?, 109 Colum L Rev 538, 559 n 148 (2009) (citing
sources); Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fearof Judging:Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal
Courts 95-103 (Chicago 1998) (arguing that the Guidelines "rob the traditional sentencing rite of
much of its moral force and significance").
62 See, for example, United States v Green, 436 F3d 449,456-57 (4th Cir 2006) (noting the
difficulty of assessing the district court's sentencing decision as such review involves applications
of binding law, consideration of advisory guidelines, factual findings, and judgments made to give
effect to congressional policies); United States v Mykytiuk, 415 F3d 606, 607-08 (7th Cir 2005)
(concluding that, because Booker requires district courts to take the Guidelines into consideration, a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness is a useful tool when the sentence falls within
the Guidelines range).
63 See, for example, United States v Claiborne,439F3d 479,481 (8th Cir 2006) (finding that
a fifteen-month sentence, twenty-two months less than the bottom of the advisory guideline
range, constituted an extraordinary reduction and was not justified by "comparably extraordinary circumstances"). However, a sentence outside of the Guidelines range would not be presumptively unreasonable. See, for example, United States v Howard, 454 F3d 700, 703 (7th Cir
2006) ("[A] sentence outside the range ... does not warrant a presumption of unreasonableness."); United States v Matheny, 450 F3d 633, 642 (6th Cir 2006) (same); United States v Myers,
439 F3d 415,417 (8th Cir 2006) (same).
6
Rita v UnitedStates, 551 US 338,347-51 (2007) (stressing, however, that the presumption
was nonbinding, and that it was relevant only during appellate review).
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jected the idea of tying the extent of departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines to the burden of justification placed on the district court.6
The Court refused to demand that a trial judge offer a justification for
a sentence "proportional to the extent of the difference between the
[Guidelines] range and the sentence imposed,"" and rejected "an appellate rule that requires 'extraordinary' circumstances to justify a
sentence outside the Guidelines range."6 To hold otherwise, thought
the Court, would be to verge on reinvesting the Guidelines with the
mandatory authority stripped by Booker.6
Moreover, the Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned the practice
of deviating from the Guidelines for broad-based policy reasons, not
only because of circumstances particular to the case before the judge.
For instance, a judge may sentence a particular criminal more harshly
than the Guidelines demand not because that criminal has done something worse than the typical offender, but because the judge believes
that the Guidelines range for that crime is generally too low.'o The re-

65

Gall v United States, 552 US 38,45-47 (2007).

Id at 45, quoting United States v Gall,446 F3d 884,889 (8th Cir 2006).
Gall, 552 US at 47 (rejecting, in addition, the use of a formula to calculate the strength of
the required justifications). The Court did note that "[i]n reviewing the reasonableness of a
sentence outside the Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines." Id. See also id at
46 ("It is also clear that a district judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any
departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an
unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications."). It is
not entirely clear how to reconcile these competing statements, but they are most likely best
understood as an admonition that the Sentencing Guidelines are not irrelevant but may not
receive anything approaching the deference they previously commanded.
68 Consider Gall, 552 US at 47 ("[T]he approaches we reject come too close to creating an
impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.").
69
See Kimbrough v United States, 552 US 85, 110-12 (2007) (allowing the district court to
consider criticisms of the 100-to-1 ratio when deciding to impose a sentence outside of the
Guidelines range for crack cocaine offenses); Rita, 551 US at 351 (allowing a judge to deviate
from the Guidelines "because the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a)
considerations"). See also Spears v United States, 129 S Ct 840, 843-44 (2009) (allowing the "categorical rejection and replacement" of the 100-to-1 ratio suggested by the Guidelines for crack
cocaine violations).
70 Consider Kimbrough, 552 US at 110-12 (suggesting, in contrast, that the Guidelines for
crack cocaine violations are often too high). But see id at 109 (noting that a district court judge
may be subject to additional scrutiny if she sentences outside of the Guidelines range because
she believes the range does not reflect the policy considerations described in §3553(a)). This is
not to say that the result in Kimbrough is unbeneficial. The 100-to-1 powder-to-crack cocaine
disparity at issue in that case was likely misguided and ineffective, and the Sentencing Commission had attempted to alter it on several occasions. See id at 99 (noting a proposed amendment
to change the 100-to-1 ratio to a 1-to-1 ratio in 1995, as well as reports issued by the Commission
recommending change in 1997,2002, and 2007). See also Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed Reg 25074, 25075-77 (1995) (recommending equal sentences for crack and powder cocaine offenses).
66
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sult is a new set of judge-made rules to govern sentencing, much as
Easterbrook predicted.
2. The misallocation of institutional authority.
What the Court never fully acknowledged was the mismatch between the problem Booker set out to cure and the structural remedy it
chose. Consider the range of potential institutional divisions of sentencing authority. There are two relevant dimensions: which institutional actor (agencies or courts) will set the rules governing the relationship between criminal conduct and penal sentence; and which institutional actor (courts or juries) will apply those rules to the case at
hand, including finding the relevant facts upon which to base sentencing. Along these two dimensions, four institutional arrangements are
possible, as represented in Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1: FOUR POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Rulemaking Body
Judge

Jury

Agency
I.
Sentencing Guidelines
Regime

Court
II.
Pre-Sentencing Guidelines and Post-Booker

IV.

III.

Solution?

Before Booker, Cell I represented the status quo. Because Booker addressed itself exclusively to the problem of judicial factfinding, a
move to Cell IV might have seemed appropriate. In particular, the
Court could have cured the Guidelines' constitutional infirmity simply
by structuring trials such that juries found all of the relevant facts
through special verdict forms. For instance, in a prosecution for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, the jury could have been
asked to find the precise quantity of narcotics in the defendant's possession, whether the defendant had employed a firearm in a narcotics
transaction, and so forth-the same facts that courts were finding under the Guidelines regime." Prosecutors would have submitted to the
71 Special verdict forms are already commonly used in civil cases. See FRCP 49. For instance, juries in tort cases are often called upon to decide what proportion of fault is attributable
to the plaintiff and what proportion to each of multiple defendants. Special verdict forms in
criminal cases would present no unique challenges. See Stuart F. Schaffer, Comment, Informing

the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981

Duke L J 824, 828-29 ("[Tlhe use of special verdicts enables both trial and appellate courts to
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jury the same evidence they were already in the practice of presenting
to the judge.72 Accordingly, the additional administrative costs involved in setting up and running such a system (above and beyond the
costs of operating before Booker) would have been minimal."
But because of the remedy the Court chose, the move was instead
to Cell II-to a sentencing system dominated by the judiciary. To the
courts' preexisting authority to find facts in individual cases, the Supreme Court added the power to craft retail (and perhaps wholesale)
sentencing policy.
This transfer of authority may turn out to be a positive development for the law of sentencing. The Sentencing Commission's work
was hardly viewed as an unqualified success; rather, many observers
viewed the Commission as needlessly punitive and inadequately attuned to modern criminal realities.74 Perhaps the judiciary will do a
better job, particularly because it is less subject to political whim and
influence. But it is notable that the original evil targeted by Blakely
and Booker remains essentially undiminished."
At the same time, the problems that the Sentencing Guidelines
had been designed to address have now reappeared. Determinate sentencing was created to alleviate perceived injustices that spanned the
political spectrum. Conservatives were concerned that liberal judges
were awarding overly lenient sentences; liberals were concerned that

monitor closely the jury's performance of its designated task. By permitting full disclosure of the
findings of fact, special verdict submission fits neatly into the comparative negligence regime.").
Such a system would have placed greater control in the hands of prosecutors, who would have
the authority to decide what conduct to charge. Booker, 543 US at 256 (Breyer dissenting) (using
verdict forms "would prohibit the judge from basing a sentence upon any conduct other than the
conduct the prosecutor chose to charge"). But this might well have been an improvement over a
system that allows judges to sentence based on conduct that prosecutors could never have proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether or not they chose to charge it.
72 This has been the case with drug quantities that have continued to be submitted to juries
after Blakely. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be
Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 Am Crim L Rev 217,229 (2004).
73 Alternatively, the Supreme Court could simply have required that juries determine
sentences, presumably with regard to the Guidelines. The Guidelines would have maintained
much-perhaps all-of their force, the Sixth Amendment violation would have ceased to exist,
and the hassle of employing special verdict forms would have been avoided. Yet the Court
eschewed this option as well.
74 See, for example, Thomas N. Whiteside, The Realities of Federal Sentencing: Beyond the
Criticism, 91 Nw U L Rev 1574, 1576 (1997) (noting that much of the early criticism of the
Guidelines focused on their severity, especially in the drug context).
75 I do not mean to take a position on whether it was in fact a negative feature of the prior
system. I mean only to illustrate that the structural problem Blakely and Booker meant to address has survived those cases largely intact.
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conservative judges were sentencing too harshly or that judges were
sentencing based on race or other prohibited characteristics.
In the wake of Blakely and Booker, judges will undoubtedly elect
to sentence outside of the Guidelines in some meaningful fraction of
cases. And when a judge takes this step, it is likely to be for reasons
that invoke the sorts of concerns the Sentencing Guidelines were originally meant to address. For a judge to impose a sentence outside of
the Guidelines range, she must believe that the cost of doing so-the
threat of being reversed, with attendant reputational penalties and
increased workload-is outweighed by some personal benefit." The
more that a judge believes an especially harsh or especially lenient
sentence is justified (on ideological or other grounds)," the more likely she will be to impose that outlier sentence."
Accordingly, judges at the extremities of the ideological spectrum
will be most likely to impose out-of-Guidelines sentences, and they
will be abetted in this tendency where the ideology of the appellate
judges tracks that of the district judges. Thus, the majority of out-ofGuidelines sentences will be handed down by conservative judges in
conservative circuits and liberal judges in liberal circuits, in many cases on the basis of reasons that the Guidelines sought to place out of
bounds." The Supreme Court has managed to enshrine (or even dis76
See James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity:Before and after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,42 J L & Econ 271, 272 (1999)

(noting the "unusual coalition of liberals and conservatives" that worked together to pass the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
77 See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 140-41 (Harvard 2008) (noting that, even in
the absence of financial incentives, judges are likely to be concerned about how their quarterly
statistics will affect their reputations). This threat is probably fairly low; since Booker was decided, very few sentences have been reversed as substantively unreasonable. See David C. Holman, Note, Death by a Thousand Cases:After Booker, Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate

the Sixth Amendment, 50 Wm & Mary L Rev 267,279 (2008) (stating that courts rarely overturn
within-range and above-range sentences as unreasonable, although they are much more likely to
reverse below-range sentences). Nonetheless, the prospect of reversal remains salient for district
court judges, and it is of course possible that this threat is itself responsible for the prevalence of
within-Guidelines sentences and the low number of reversals. There are judicial incentives to
sentence within the Guidelines, see note 67, and judges will thus deviate from the Guidelines
only in selected cases where the incentives to do so are higher.
78
See Kimbrough, 552 US at 110-12 (permitting judges to deviate from the Guidelines
based on disagreements with the policies embedded within them).
79 See, for example, id (noting that the district court came to its decision, in part, because of
the Commission's "consistent and emphatic" criticisms of the crack-powder disparity).
Consider Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging under the
8o
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive PoliticalTheory and Evidence, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 24, 47-52

(2007) (finding similar effects even under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines regime). See
also Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach, and Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politicsat Sentencing, 103 Nw U L Rev 1371, 1388-91 (2009) (demonstrating how the sentencing disparities based
on policy and political affiliation will develop further in light of post-Booker Supreme Court
decisions); Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines:
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till) the sentencing disparities that motivated the Guidelines' creation
in the first instance.
The result is a system that is likely to underperform the prior regime in several important respects.1 There will certainly be cases in
which judges will be better able to tailor sentences to fit offenders and
their crimes under the advisory Guidelines." This ability to consider
penalties on a case-by-case basis is, of course, the principal advantage
of charging judges with the task of sentencing. Yet the cost of endowing the federal courts with this modicum of flexibility in sentencing is
that racial and ideological disparities are likely to reappear, possibly in
even more pernicious form. And that cost may not be balanced by a
corresponding benefit from reinvigorating the role of the courts.
In many cases the judges who diverge from the advisory Guidelines' ranges will do so for the wrong reasons. The most ideologically
extreme judges will be the most likely to sentence outside of the advised range." And where courts and the Sentencing Commission disagree on sentencing policy, the Commission holds numerous comparative advantages. Like other administrative agencies, the Sentencing
Commission is staffed by individuals chosen for their expertise in sentencing law and procedure who have studied the problems involved in
criminal sentencing far more thoroughly and systematically than the
typical district court judge." Similarly, and again like the typical administrative agency, the Sentencing Commission has at its disposal a wide
range of procedural tools that judges cannot draw upon.6 In the course

Judicial Politics; Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U Chi L Rev 715, 732-40 (2008) (demon-

strating sentencing disparities based on the political affiliation of the judge and the particular
circuit, and discussing the implications of these disparities post-Booker).
81 Consider Bibas, Schanzenbach, and Tiller, 103 Nw U L Rev at 1377-80 (cited in note 80)
(arguing, based on the behavior of judges with particular political affiliations in different districts,
that clear, binding rules are necessary to prevent "evasion and manipulation" in sentencing).
82 Of course, even the mandatory Guidelines never specified a precise sentence, only a
range. Accordingly, the fact that the Guidelines are now advisory will only aid judges in sentencing properly in those cases where the appropriate sentence-by some proper metric-is outside
of the Guidelines range.
83

See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:Judges; Prosecutors and the Exercise of Discre-

tion, 117 Yale L J 1420, 1481-82 (2008) (describing Booker as having "recharged" the sentencing
judge).
8
See Joshua B. Fischman and Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter?
The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing *16-21 (unpublished manuscript, 2009), online at

http://ssrn.comlabstract=1434123 (visited Feb 14,2010).
8
See, for example, Ronald I. Krotoszynski, Jr, Why Deference? Implied Delegations; Agency
Expertise and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin L Rev 735,737 (2002) (arguing that administrative expertise provides the best rationale for judicial deference to administrative agencies).
86 See, for example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr, Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis 85 Georgetown L J 2225, 2239 (1997) (noting the superiority of the notice-and-comment procedure over
judicial decisionmaking procedures); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative
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of designing sentencing policy, the Sentencing Commission can conduct
studies, analyze data, and solicit public comments.r Courts, by contrast,
are limited in the main to the evidence presented by the parties before
them. They have neither the resources nor the ability to examine issues
or evidence beyond the immediate case. The Supreme Court has recognized as much in its post-Booker jurisprudence.
To be sure, the Sentencing Commission is subject to much of the
same political pressure for ever-higher sentences that Congress faces.
As a result, the Guidelines have grown ever more draconian throughout their lifetime. Democratic responsiveness" is often viewed as an
advantage of relying upon agencies rather than courts to formulate
policy. Here, if political pressure is generating excessively severe sentencing guidelines,7 allowing judges to craft sentencing policy could
lead to superior results."
State, 133 U Pa L Rev 549, 575 (1985) (noting that agency members are often involved in creating legislation, and therefore have a better understanding of legislative intent).
87 This is not to say that the Commission has always performed this role faithfully or effectively. For instance, despite a statutory mandate, the Sentencing Commission never used data on
the rate and degree of Guidelines departures to modify the Guidelines to better reflect judicial
views on their accuracy. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act) § 401(a)(2), Pub L No 108-21,117 Stat 650,667. Of
course, this is only one example; in other domains the Sentencing Commission has engaged in
the technocratic study of sentencing much as its creators presumably intended. See, for example,
Kimbrough, 552 US at 97-99 (describing the Sentencing Commission's work to analyze and
restructure the crack cocaine Guidelines).
88 See Rita,551 US at 349:
The result is a set of Guidelines that seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both in
principle and in practice. Given the difficulties of doing so, the abstract and potentially conflicting nature of §3553(a)'s general sentencing objectives, and the differences of philosophical
view among those who work within the criminal justice community as to how best to apply
general sentencing objectives, it is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve §3553(a)'s objectives.
89 See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr and Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency
Norm-Entrepreneurship,115 Yale L J 2623, 2626 (2006) (arguing that agencies are more democratically accountable than judges); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to
Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L J 2580, 2587 (2006) (noting the executive branch's political
responsiveness and accountability); Charles H. Koch, Jr, JudicialReview of Administrative Discretion, 54 Geo Wash L Rev 469, 485 (1986) (arguing that agencies are better than courts at
distilling public opinion).
9 By which I mean greater than necessary to promote any reasonable social objective, be
it utilitarian or retributivist. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Happinessand Punishment,76 U Chi L Rev 1037 (2009) (discussing the purposes of
punishment and hypothesizing that contrary to expectations, longer prison sentences and greater
fines do not significantly impact happiness).
91 There is some evidence that Booker has led to reduced sentences by comparison with
the standard Guideline ranges. See United States Sentencing Commission, US. Sentencing
Commission Preliminary QuarterlyData Report 7 (2009), online at http://www.ussc.gov/sccases/

USSC_2009_Quarter Report_4th.pdf (visited Feb 14,2010) (reporting that through the first nine
months of 2009, approximately 14 percent of all sentences were lower than the applicable Guide-

2010]1

Booker Reconsidered

1109

The particular hybrid solution chosen in Booker is ill suited to
that end, however. Whatever sense there might be in allowing politically independent judges to set sentencing policy, the hundreds of district judges who will now be undertaking that task simultaneously and
with only minimal appellate supervision are unlikely to arrive at more
satisfactory outcomes. And this is accompanied by the fact that the
Supreme Court's innovations in Booker and its progeny do not even
alleviate the problem they were designed to address, namely the sentencing of offenders based on facts never proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. In these respects, the Booker line of cases can hardly be considered a success.
If Congress's decision to create the Sentencing Commission was
the correct one, the Court's transfer of power from that administrative
body to the courts will be costly in the net. And if Congress erred in
creating the Sentencing Commission, a shift in authority to the less-able
courts is unlikely to produce the advantages the Court envisioned.
CONCLUSION

In his dissent in Booker, Judge Frank Easterbrook predicted dire
consequences if the Supreme Court were to invalidate the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Those consequences have not arisen, largely
because the Court has ducked the implications of Judge Easterbrook's
pragmatic logic (and its own). But in an effort to salvage a set of
workable sentencing rules, the Supreme Court has settled upon a division of institutional responsibilities that serves none of the parties
involved in the criminal justice system well and fails to address the
problem that catalyzed its intervention in the first instance. The Sentencing Commission may not have functioned perfectly, but the Supreme Court's attempt at ad hoc institutional design seems unlikely to
produce any better results.

lines ranges based on § 3553(a) factors, while only slightly more than 1 percent of sentences were
higher than the relevant Guidelines due to §3553(a) factors).
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